Teed Rockwell
Sonoma State University, Philosophy, Emeritus
- My thesis defends a radical version of what is now called the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. I argue that the mind... moreMy thesis defends a radical version of what is now called the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending on the goals and projects of the person who has the mind. The Mind is thus best described as a behavioral field that fluctuates within the Brain/Body/World Nexus. Was revised and expanded to become my MIT press book "Neither Brain nor Ghost"edit
Science-inspired arguments for atheism confuse 1) claims that are unfalsifiable within a paradigm with 2) claims that have been scientifically proven by that paradigm. This confusion enables atheists to confidently claim they would change... more
Science-inspired arguments for atheism confuse 1) claims that are unfalsifiable within a paradigm with 2) claims that have been scientifically proven by that paradigm. This confusion enables atheists to confidently claim they would change their position, once they encounter “scientific evidence” that cannot possibly exist. It also inspires theists to search in vain for scientific evidence to support their position, which necessarily dissolves into a handful of mechanisms once it is in their grasp. Neither side notices that the deck was stacked against the theists from the beginning. A close look at possible candidates for scientific evidence of atheistic (or theistic) claims reveals that, given our current assumptions, no such data could possibly exist.
Research Interests: Religion, Philosophy Of Religion, Atheism, Theology, Science and Religion, and 15 moreDoctrine of God, Agnosticism, History of Atheism, Proof of God, Epigenetics, Darwinism, Darwin, Open Theism, Miracles, New Atheism, Atheism/Secular Studies, Skeptical Theism, Theism, The Problem of Evil and the Existence of God (Brief Essay), and Classical Theism
The Tilde fallacy is the mistaken inference that, because an argument contains a Tilde it can be called the Null hypothesis, and therefore does not need to be positively defended. I show how this argument is used to defend Logical... more
The Tilde fallacy is the mistaken inference that, because an argument contains a Tilde it can be called the Null hypothesis, and therefore does not need to be positively defended. I show how this argument is used to defend Logical Positivism, Libertarianism and Atheism. It is also used to defend a position I call Mortalism, which uses it to set the burden of proof on those who believe in some form of personal immortality. In some cases the argument is actually self-contradictory, in others it is only an illegitimate use of Occam's Razor. In Mortalism's case, there is a contradiction, but it is phenomenological, not logical
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Religion, Atheism, Critical Thinking, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Continental Philosophy of Religion (Theology), and 14 moreAnalytic Philosophy of Religion, Daniel Dennett, Religious Experience, Argumentation Theory and Critical Thinking, Religious Studies, Fallacies, Douglas Hofstadter, Fundamentalist Atheism, New Atheism, Reincarnation, Cases of the Reincarnation Type, Reincarnation Research, Philosophy of Religion, and Scientific Atheism
Many modern theological debates are built around a false dichotomy between 1) an atheism which asserts that the universe was created by purposeless mechanical processes and 2) acceptance of a religious system which requires both faith in... more
Many modern theological debates are built around a false dichotomy between 1) an atheism which asserts that the universe was created by purposeless mechanical processes and 2) acceptance of a religious system which requires both faith in the infallibility of sacred texts and belief in a supernatural God. I propose a form of naturalistic theism, which rejects sacred texts as unjustified, and supernaturalism as incoherent. I argue that rejecting these two elements of traditional organized religion would have a strongly positive impact on the beliefs and practices of religion, even though many religious people feel strongly attached to them. It is belief in sacred texts that is responsible for most of the evil done in the name of religion, not belief in God. Many of the strongest arguments for atheism work only against a supernatural God, and have no impact on the question of the existence of a natural God.
Research Interests: Atheism, Theology, Historical Theology, Practical theology, Systematic Theology, and 43 morePhilosophical Theology, Feminist Theology, Theological Ethics, Medieval Theology, Old Testament Theology, Theological Hermeneutics, Liberation Theology, Kalam (Islamic Theology), Orthodox Theology, Womanist Theology, Theological Anthropology, Theology and Culture, Catholic Theology, Biblical Theology, Ecumenical Theology, Moral Theology, Political Theology, History of Atheism, Naturalism, Daniel Dennett, Darwinism, Literary Darwinism Or Evolutionary Literary Theory, Open Theism, Islamic Theology, Christian Theology, Fundamentalist Atheism, New Atheism, Atheism/Secular Studies, Richard Dawkins, Skeptical Theism, Theism, Modern Atheism, Seventh-day adventist theology, Non-Theism, Skepticism, Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, Open Theism, Hermeneutics, Biblical Theology, Inter-faith Contact and Theology, Theism, Atheism, social engineering, Scientific Atheism, Classical Theism, Theism vs. Naturalism, Science and theism, and Free Will Theism
This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped themselves into complex patterns that eventually became living conscious beings. There is no decisive reason to question Peirce’s suggestion... more
This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped themselves into complex patterns that eventually became living conscious beings. There is no decisive reason to question Peirce’s suggestion that mind came first and that mechanical causality emerges when regions of a fundamentally conscious universe settle into deterministic habits. If we define consciousness in a way that ignores clearly accidental properties such as looking and behaving like us, some form of panpsychism is not only possible but plausible. Ignoring this possibility could cause us to subconsciously exclude legitimate avenues of research.
Research Interests: Evolutionary Biology, Metaphysics, Theology, Systematic Theology, Philosophical Theology, and 16 moreMetaphysics of Consciousness, Consciousness, Process Philosophy, Charles S. Peirce, Panpsychism, Daniel Dennett, Darwin, Pantheism, Panentheism, Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Evolutionary Panentheism, Panpsycism, Panpsychism; representationalism; Russellian Monism, Consciousness Panpsychism Biosemiotics, and Whiteheadian Panpsychism
Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or metaphysics masquerading as science. This is true as far as it goes, but Darwinian atheism relies on an argument which is equally... more
Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or metaphysics masquerading as science. This is true as far as it goes, but Darwinian atheism relies on an argument which is equally metaphysical, which I call the “No Gaps, No God” argument. This atheist argument is metaphysical because it relies on a kind of conceptual necessity, rather than scientific observations or experiments. “No Gaps No God” is a much better metaphysical argument than “God of the Gaps,” because the latter is based on a clearly false conditional inference. However, there are also good, but not decisive, arguments against the “No Gaps No God” argument. Because metaphysical arguments never resolve as decisively as scientific research questions, there will probably always be a legitimate controversy at the metaphysical level on this topic, even though there is no serious controversy about Darwinian science itself. If this fact were more widely acknowledged, it could help to defuse the controversy over teaching Darwin in thepublic schools
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Religion, Atheism, Theology, Philosophical Theology, and 12 moreMetaphysics of Consciousness, Metaphysics of Mind, Metaphysics of Science, Darwinism, Darwin, Darwinian evolution, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Metaphysics of Causation, New Atheism, Dennett, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the allegedly scientific view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the... more
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the allegedly scientific view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna’s argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to “The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything.” Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world
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Robert Thurman argues that the Buddhist tradition shares essential principles and methods with Western Science. He says “The Buddhist tradition is more science than religion. . . more a process of education than an adoption of a credo or... more
Robert Thurman argues that the Buddhist tradition shares essential principles and methods with Western Science. He says “The Buddhist tradition is more science than religion. . . more a process of education than an adoption of a credo or a joining of an institution.” I think there is some truth to this statement, but it can also be misleading. Buddhism is to some degree suspended half-way between the two Western prototypes of Science and Religion, without fitting comfortably in either category.
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To read my blog on Islam, click on the link above next to my name. My posts were usually built around my responses to various Islamophobic memes. This page of the blog is devoted to responses to the question. "Why don't Muslims speak out... more
To read my blog on Islam, click on the link above next to my name. My posts were usually built around my responses to various Islamophobic memes. This page of the blog is devoted to responses to the question. "Why don't Muslims speak out against extremism?" The answer is they do, and these responses get buried on page 12 while the extremists get the headlines.
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Much of this paper found its way into other papers, and into my book Neither Brain nor Ghost. Nevertheless, there is much in it which does not appear elsewhere, and which I think is still worth reading.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind, Dynamical Systems, Metaphysics of Consciousness, Theory of Mind, Emergent Phenomena, and 15 moreCausal reasoning, Metaphysics of Mind, Metaphysics of Science, Free Will, Causality, Metaphysics of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Causal Inference, Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition, Emergentism, Downward causation, Free will and determinism debate, Philosophy of Mind and Metaphyics, Philosophy of mind Free will and Consciousness, Causal Analysis, and Causality and Analyticity
I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending on the goals and projects of the person who has the mind. The Mind is thus best described as a behavioral field that fluctuates within the... more
I argue that the mind not only extends beyond the brain, but that its borders fluctuate depending on the goals and projects of the person who has the mind. The Mind is thus best described as a behavioral field that fluctuates within the Brain/Body/World Nexus
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Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness.(MDM) This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the... more
Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness.(MDM) This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question "how do you get experience out of meat?" actually fragments into at least three different questions.
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
(1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)?
(2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)?
(3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)?
Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.
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Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more... more
Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe.
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The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution fallacy, but it is the critic’s use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny... more
The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) have been criticized as committing what is called the coupling/constitution fallacy, but it is the critic’s use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first place. The burden of proof has fallen on the Mind/Brain identity theory, now that our intuitions/prejudices no longer support it. One of those “intuitions” is the Aristotelian assumption that the world can be neatly divided into objects that possess intrinsic causal powers, and the causal relations that connect those objects. In modern science, however, the concept of intrinsic causal powers is only a temporary stopgap that makes it possible to begin research in a particular area. It therefore seems best to assume that the line between mind and world is both pragmatic and dynamic. Consequently, the mind might best described as a fluctuating field, rather than an object or structur
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Embedded Systems, and 14 moreExtended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Embodied Mind Theory, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Extended Mind (Humanities), Extended Cognition, The Extended Mind, "extended Mind"-Thesis, extended cognition, Adams Aizawa Rupert, HEC, Adams and Aizawa, Rob Rupert, and Andy Clark
Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is... more
Leonard Bernstein argues that our musical experience must be constructed out of individual notes, the way Chomsky sees sentences constructed out of individual words. I argue that our experience of music, and experience in general is equally well accounted for by seeing it as starting with an experience of an undifferentiated whole, without even awareness of a distinction between self and environment. New experiences are not acquired by stuffing sense data into the brain, but rather by dividing a primordially unified experience into smaller interacting parts. This view dissolves many traditional problems in philosophy of mind, and also more accurately reflects what we have learned about connectionist neuroscience.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Distributed Cognition, and 13 moreEmbodied Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Embedded Systems, Embodied Ontology, Extended Mind, Cognitive Linguistics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Embodied Music Cognition, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Extended Mind (Humanities), and Extended Cognition
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Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, Memory (Cognitive Psychology), and 14 moreNeuroimaging, Social Representations, Mental Representation, Embodied Cognition, Computational Neuroscience, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Representations, Mental Representation and Content, Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Cognitive Neuroscience, Knowledge Representation, Representation Theory, Representation, and Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, defended most prominently by Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on... more
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, defended most prominently by
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
Anthony Chemero, proposes that biological cognition does not require representation. I propose a more moderate position – that biological cognition often relies on continuous analog representation, of the sort described by James' theory of radical empiricism, rather than the discrete digital representations described by the language
of thought theory. I concede, however, that analog representations are borderline cases of representation. The most prototypical cases of representation are those hypotheses developed during the process that Dewey called inquiry. Inquiry is necessary only when our harmonious relationship with our environment is disrupted
in some way, which in turn requires us to represent that environment as an “other” as we figure out how to restore harmony again. Perception is legitimately describable as “direct” because we do not need to make representations when the organism is in harmony with the environment.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy Of Language, Pragmatism, and 29 morePragmatics, Neuroimaging, Cognitive Semantics, Mental Representation, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Neurophilosophy, Cognitive Linguistics, John Dewey, Music Cognition, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Computational Philosophy of Language, Pragmatics, Philosophy of Language and communication, Cognitive Neuroscience, Knowledge Representation, Philosophy of Language (Humanities), Representation Theory, Speech Act Theory, Non-representational theory, Non-representational theories, Speech acts, American Pragmatism, Radical empiricism, Jerry Fodor, James J. Gibson, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and Dewey's Theory of Inquiry
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Cognitive Science began with the assumption sometimes called Cartesian Materialism-- that the brain is an autonomous machine that can be studied as a closed system. The challenges of solving the puzzles presupposed by that assumption led... more
Cognitive Science began with the assumption sometimes called Cartesian Materialism-- that the brain is an autonomous machine that can be studied as a closed system. The challenges of solving the puzzles presupposed by that assumption led to a recognition that mind is both embodied and embedded i. e. it cannot be separated from either the rest of the organism or from the organism’s symbiotic relationship with its environment. The unavoidable (but often ignored) implication of this conclusion is that if our environment includes other minds, our minds must also be embodied by other minds. This means that we are irreducibly social, for the same reasons that we are irreducibly embodied and embedded in an environment.
This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones. Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.
This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones. Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.
Research Interests: Business Ethics, Social Theory, Social Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and 30 moreGame Theory, Dynamical Systems, Social Sciences, Developmental Psychopathology, Personal Relationships, Decision And Game Theory, Psychopathology, Emotions (Social Psychology), Love, Critical Social Psychology, Philosophy of Psychopathology, Romantic Relationships, Philosophy of Love, Parent Child Relationships, Artificial Inteligence, Psychopathy, Stakeholder Relationships & Issues Management, Theories of Love, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Social Psycology, Inteligencia artificial, Romantic love, Philosophy of Love and Sex, Sociology of intimacy (love, sexuality, family), Saving the Love, SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, Psychopathic Personality Disorder, Love and Relationships, Business applications of game theory, and Parasocial Realtionships
Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness... more
Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.
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B. F. Skinner was an active and articulate philosopher for many years. His acknowledged greatness as a pioneer in developing behaviorist laboratory techniques has fostered the assumption that his philosophy and his psychology are a... more
B. F. Skinner was an active and articulate philosopher for many years. His acknowledged greatness as a pioneer in developing behaviorist laboratory techniques has fostered the assumption that his philosophy and his psychology are a package deal i.e. that his philosophy must be accepted in order for a behavior modification technology to be successful, and that the data discovered in behaviorist laboratories are strong evidence for his philosophy. In this paper, I will show that his data actually contradict his philosophy. Behaviorist research does not provide proof of a deterministic universe. On the contrary, It provides the strongest inductive evidence we have for the existence of free will. Skinner’s own writings on scientific method are cited as support for the existence of freedom, not only in humans, but in rats and pigeons as well. The reasons that Skinner misinterpreted his own data base are also cited. These include the inability to tell a fact from a presupposition, and a definition of free will derived from Hume which renders that concept magical and incoherent. A new definition of freedom is given which is comprehensible in behaviorist terms, and which fits our commonsense experience of ourselves more accurately than does the straw ghost that Skinner labels “Autonomous Man”. With this new definition of freedom, it no longer becomes necessary to go beyond freedom and dignity for society to reap the benefits of behavior modification technology.
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This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of Wundt, his most well known... more
This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which was at least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex as the fundamental psychological unit, rather than the sense datum. When cognitive psychology embraced functionalism, it made the most radical break from atomism in psychology's history, which is reason for optimism. However, there are still certain presuppositions which make cognitive psychology vulnerable to some of the weaknesses of atomism, and research in a variety of areas is starting to uncover them.
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I propose a semi-eliminative reduction of Fodor’s concept of module to the concept of Attractor Basin which is used in Cognitive Dynamic Systems Theory (DST). I show how Attractor basins perform the same explanatory function as module in... more
I propose a semi-eliminative reduction of Fodor’s concept of module to the concept of Attractor Basin which is used in Cognitive Dynamic Systems Theory (DST). I show how Attractor basins perform the same explanatory function as module in several DST based research program. Attractor basins in some organic dynamic systems have even been able to perform cognitive functions which are equivalent to the If/Then/Else loop in the computer language LISP. I suggest directions for future research programs which could find similar equivalencies between organic dynamic systems and other cognitive functions. Research that went in these directions could help us discover how (and/or if) it is possible to use Dynamic Systems Theory to more accurately model the cognitive functions that are now being modeled by subroutines in Symbolic AI computer models. If such a reduction of subroutines to basins of attraction is possible, it could free AI from the limitations that prompted Fodor to say that it was impossible to model certain higher level cognitive functions.
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The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell exactly what the difference is between a simulation and a theory. I believe that this distinction was originally... more
The controversy between the theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory (ST) has evolved so that it is often hard to tell exactly what the difference is between a simulation and a theory. I believe that this distinction was originally inspired, and can be freshly reconceived, as the distinction between verbal abstractions and concrete pictures. I argue that the multi-dimensional spaces described by connectionist neuroscience are best understood as pictures of a special sort. These multi-dimensional pictures do not have the limitations of ordinary three-dimensional pictures, and are capable of performing many of the cognitive functions that were traditionally thought to be the exclusive domain of abstract linguistic concepts. Consequently, there is a real possibility that a pure simulation theory could actually explain some sophisticated kinds of social cognition, without having to rely on a hybrid that combines simulations and theories. Paradoxically, such a pure simulation theory would not actually use simulations in the strictest sense of that word, because something can be a simulation only if it is verbally labeled as a copy of something else. Rather this kind of social cognition would establish vector transformations between perception and behavior without requiring any verbal labels at all. This would mean that the emotions caused by perceptions of other people would not be simulations of other people’s emotions, but rather the same emotion transferred by a kind of emotional contagion.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Dynamical Systems, Philosophy of Psychology, Embodied Cognition, and 13 moreEmbodied Mind and Cognition, Embedded Systems, Nonlinear dynamics, Extended Mind, Compassion, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Compassionate Communication, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Embodied Interaction, Embodied Social Cognition, and Embodied Intersubjectivity
I wrote this paper as part of a discussion in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1997. The keynote article was drawn from Bernard Baars' "In the Theater of Consciousness". Surprisingly, I've been running into papers that cite it, so... more
I wrote this paper as part of a discussion in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1997. The keynote article was drawn from Bernard Baars' "In the Theater of Consciousness". Surprisingly, I've been running into papers that cite it, so I thought I should put it up.
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Until Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words . Today it is an assumption of both scientific and popular common... more
Until Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words . Today it is an assumption of both scientific and popular common sense that science provides knowledge about the world because it uses mathematical formulae to make predictions about the future. However, an understanding of neurocomputational algorithms can justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which utilizes these algorithms without analyzing them or rationally understanding them. This is why it is possible for us to learn from stories and metaphors, even without learning algorithms.
Research Interests: History, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and 45 moreComparative Literature, English Literature, Theology, Literature, Connectionist Modeling, Literary Criticism, Cognition, Social Cognition, Connectionism, Storytelling, Use of story-telling in games, Literary Theory, Interactive Digital Storytelling, Modernist Literature (Literary Modernism), Cognitive Neuropsychology, Neural Networks, Cognitive Linguistics, Transmedial Storytelling, Postmodern Fiction, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Contemporary Fiction, Cognitive Anthropology, Dystopian Fiction, Science Fiction and Fantasy, Cognitive Neuroscience, Short story (Literature), Neural Network, Organisational Change + Storytelling, Interactive Storytelling, Fiction, Cognitive Sciences, Literatura, Aritificial Neural Nets, Myth and History, Short story, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Story, Storytelling and Self-Confrontation: Parables as Communication Strategies, Narrative, Mulitmedia editing, Journalism, Photojournalism, Storytelling, Audio and Video editing and digitizing, Television Journalism, Visual Communication, Artifical Neural Networks, Parables, Artifical Neural Network(ANN), Inspirational Stories, Intellectual History, With Particular Focus on City Centres, Life Stories, and Textual Editing, and Transformation Through Story
Sellars and Dewey each isolated and critiqued different aspects of the atomistic epistemology of the logical positivists: Dewey labeled his target "Sensationalistic Empiricism", and Sellars labeled his "the Myth of the Given." The main... more
Sellars and Dewey each isolated and critiqued different aspects of the atomistic epistemology of the logical positivists: Dewey labeled his target "Sensationalistic Empiricism", and Sellars labeled his "the Myth of the Given." The main theme of this paper will be the similarity and differences in their responses to this kind of philosophy, and how both responses can be clarified and strengthened by considering recent discoveries in Cognitive Neuroscience. What we have recently learned about neural architecture accounts for a distinction between knowledge and experience that is a recurrent theme in both Sellars and Dewey. Dewey, however, made a sharper break from the positivists by seeing all experience as shaped by skills and abilities which were designed to acheive certain goals and were colored by emotions. The connectionist architecture used in Cognitive Neuroscience supports this view, as does the psychological research of J.J. Gibson. Once we consider the ways in which connectionist cognitive abilities differ from linguistic ones, Sellars' distinction between thoughts and sensations, and Dewey's distinction between knowledge and experience, can both be plausibly accounted for.
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The pragmatists were caught between two different philosophical movements and were equally critical of both. On the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical... more
The pragmatists were caught between two different philosophical movements and were equally critical of both. On the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical disputes that had no possibility of being resolved. But on the other hand, they were equally critical of the positivist’s belief that it was possible to not do metaphysics. Nineteenth century idealist philosophy is a dead horse in the twenty-first century, and thus the pragmatist’s arguments against it are of relatively little use today. But analytic philosophy has lived under the spell of positivism for over a half a century, and still has not figured out what should go in its place. Rorty captures this dilemma quite well when he refers to philosophers like Quine, Sellars and Davidson as “post-analytic philosophers”. The pragmatist alternative to positivism is an alternative which many of these post-analytic philosophers have been drifting towards. But as long as we assume that the pragmatist’s contributions to metaphysics and epistemology should be ignored, I believe that we will not be able to free ourselves from the last reverberations of the positivist hangover.
In this paper, I examine some of the modern debates between pragmatism and so-called “realism”, especially those between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.
In this paper, I examine some of the modern debates between pragmatism and so-called “realism”, especially those between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey’s original ideas, rather than Rorty’s reinterpretations of Dewey, these problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases dissolved.
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This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the process philosophy defended by James, Dewey and Peirce. They offer a serious alternative to Kim's claim that "bits of... more
This article shows that contemporary debates in Analytic Metaphysics would be radically changed by considering the process philosophy defended by James, Dewey and Peirce. They offer a serious alternative to Kim's claim that "bits of matter and their aggregates" are all that exist. Kim's reductionism is not the only form of physicalism, indeed physics is arguably better explained as implying the existence of a fundamental process, rather than a set of fundamental particles. The article concludes with a thought experiment that shows that reductionism is based on some highly questionable speculations, not scientific facts.
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19th century neuroscience couldn’t settle the pragmatist’s disputes with earlier traditions. The pragmatists mostly had to claim, without much empirical support, that their theories account for both phenomenology and cognitive skill at... more
19th century neuroscience couldn’t settle the pragmatist’s disputes with earlier traditions. The pragmatists mostly had to claim, without much empirical support, that their theories account for both phenomenology and cognitive skill at least as effectively as did the rationalists and empiricists. Today, however, we know much more about the upper and lower levels of biological cognition, and it appears that by and large the pragmatists were right. Classical GOFAI computers, which were modeled on the Rationalist/Empiricist view of cognition, have been shown to be only a brittle metaphor that is significantly inaccurate in important areas. Pragmatism informed by neuroscience (aka neuropragmatism), points the way towards explaining both the accuracies and inaccuracies of that metaphor. This paper outlines the basic components of the pragmatist theory of knowledge, and the neuroscience that supports it.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, and 14 moreNeurology, Pragmatism, Embodied Cognition, Computational Neuroscience, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Neural Networks, Cognitive Linguistics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Neural Network, Artificial Neural Networks for modeling purposes, American Pragmatism, and Artificial Neural Networks
This paper discusses the differences and similarities between socioeconomic privilege and epistemic privilege. In discussions of identity politics, a lack of socioeconomic privilege gives one a kind of epistemic privilege similar to the... more
This paper discusses the differences and similarities between socioeconomic privilege and epistemic privilege. In discussions of identity politics, a lack of socioeconomic privilege gives one a kind of epistemic privilege similar to the privileged access often discussed in philosophy of mind debates. This is why privileged people can be accused of gaslighting when they question the assertions of marginalized people. I argue that marginalized people do have a kind of privileged access to experiences of oppression, but that this privileged access does not make their judgments on their oppression to be infallible. In certain cases, however, it does make their judgments incorrigible i.e. They may sometimes be wrong, but they should be trusted ceteris paribus because they are more likely than anyone else to be right. These judgments should also only be considered incorrigible on questions of value (what is offensive etc.) not on questions of fact.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind, Applied Ethics, Feminist Theory, Race and Racism, Critical Race Theory, and 15 moreSocial Justice, Identity politics, Metaphysics of Mind, Feminism, Racism, Marginalized Identities, Critical Race Theory and Whiteness theory, White Privilege, Feminism and Social Justice, Anti-Racism, Privileged Access, Power and privilege, Sexism, Privilege and Oppression, and Marginalization
I propose an ethics that is based on stories rather than rules. The things we do in our daily lives(our motor routines) do not require articulable goals expressible in language. We develop the "good habits" that make us good people by... more
I propose an ethics that is based on stories rather than rules. The things we do in our daily lives(our motor routines) do not require articulable goals expressible in language. We develop the "good habits" that make us good people by developing/inheriting a set of prototypes, then responding to each life situation by comparing it to those prototypes. Such a multidimensional prototype system could be
realized in a connectionist network embodied in a brain/body and embedded in a world. It would not require logical reasoning as such, but rather a form of skilled coping very different from anything else considered by ethical theory. Once we realize that ethical judgments are based on prototypes and stories, rather than rules and justice, we can rethink how best to empower the revolutionary changes that are now taking place in our concepts of ethics and courtesy.
realized in a connectionist network embodied in a brain/body and embedded in a world. It would not require logical reasoning as such, but rather a form of skilled coping very different from anything else considered by ethical theory. Once we realize that ethical judgments are based on prototypes and stories, rather than rules and justice, we can rethink how best to empower the revolutionary changes that are now taking place in our concepts of ethics and courtesy.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Social Movements, Social Theory, Cognitive Science, Ethics, and 15 moreCritical Race Theory, Connectionism, Neurophilosophy, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Affective Neuroscience, Cognitive Linguistics, John Dewey, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Archetypes, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Cognitive Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Prototyping, and Habits
Research Interests: Cultural Studies, Gender Studies, Critical Race Studies, Race Studies, Race and Racism, and 19 moreCritical Pedagogy, Critical Race Theory, Race and Ethnicity, Violence Against Women, Latin American social movements, Philosophy Of Race, Transnational Feminism, History of Race and Ethnicity, immigration, migration, identity, Race, Class, and Gender, Race, African history, African culture, African politics, African education, Afrocentrism, African-Centred Education, Black Psychology, Black Sociology, Black Family Research, Black Men, Black Youth, African Consciousness, Black Consciousness, Race and Racism, Community Education, Race and Class, Race and Racism in Higher Education Persistence Strategies of Minority Leaders in Predominantly White Institutions Social Justice in Higher Education Higher Education Institutional Leadership Organizational Socialization and Culture, Race and Ethnic Relations, Postcolonial feminisms, Human Rights and Social Justice, and Resistance Formation
Nozick’s version of libertarianism is incoherent, even if one accepts the doubtful assumption that all ethical issues can be reduced to property rights. Nozickian libertarianism requires 1) Unconditional property rights, established by 2)... more
Nozick’s version of libertarianism is incoherent, even if one accepts the doubtful assumption that all ethical issues can be reduced to property rights. Nozickian libertarianism requires 1) Unconditional property rights, established by 2) a lineage of just transfers traceable to 3) a just original acquisition. The purpose of this paper is to discredit all three of those criteria for determining property rights. No government, not even a night watchman libertarian state, can function if it makes property rights unconditional. No one in the real world can justify their property rights by citing a lineage of just acquisitions. Finally, the
concept of a unilaterally declared original acquisition, which supposedly supplies the foundation for all other property rights, is incoherent and unjust. A more moderate form of libertarianism would require institutions that strive to create approximate equality of opportunity. Those who took advantage of those opportunities would have a right to keep most of the wealth they created, and an obligation to create similar opportunities for others
concept of a unilaterally declared original acquisition, which supposedly supplies the foundation for all other property rights, is incoherent and unjust. A more moderate form of libertarianism would require institutions that strive to create approximate equality of opportunity. Those who took advantage of those opportunities would have a right to keep most of the wealth they created, and an obligation to create similar opportunities for others
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a review of Emmanuel Faye's "Heidegger: The introduction of Nazism into Philosophy."
Research Interests: Martin Heidegger, Anti-nazi resistance, Early Heidegger, Heidegger, Heidegger's later thought, and 36 moreHeidegger and Technology, Heidegger and critique of subjectivity, Heidegger's Being and Time, Nazi Germany, Schmitt and Heidegger, Representations of Nazism, Nazism, Martin Heiddeger, French phenomenology: Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Yves Lacoste and Emmanuel Levinas. Husserl and Heidegger., Fear and Deception in Nazi WWII Europe through ghettoisation, deportation and extermination, Nazi Cinema, Nazism and Religion, Dealing with the Nazi Past, Nazi Propaganda, Nazi Archaeology, Nazismo, Fenomenología Hermenéutica Lenguaje Levinas Heidegger Husserl, Heidegger Music Education Early Chidlhood Education, Ahnenerbe – Hans Schleif – Stary Dzierzgoń – Alt Christburg – Nazi Archaeology, Heidgger, Neo-Nazi, Å THINKING IN TRANSITION: NISHIDA KITARO AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Nazis, Nazi Music, Nazi 'euthanasia' programme, Nazi-Era Provenance Research, Women in Nazi Germany, Nazi Law, Bioetica Nazi, Paul Celan Und Heidegger (Poétique Et Philosophie, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Nazism: A Synopsis for International Baccalaureate History Program Communism, Nazizm, Phenomenology (Heidegger, Nazi Looted Art, and Propaganda Nazista na Teoria Hipodérmica
Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These... more
Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST). This book shows detailed scholarly connections between contemporary Cognitive Scicence and the classical pragmatists, especially John Dewey.
India, like America, is a country that nourishes creative individuality. Just as Americans have been inspired by the archetype of the Cowboy, who wanders the open spaces in search of a dream, so Indians are inspired by the Yogi, who... more
India, like America, is a country that nourishes creative individuality. Just as Americans have been inspired by the archetype of the Cowboy, who wanders the open spaces in search of a dream, so Indians are inspired by the Yogi, who wanders inner spaces in search of realization. The essential difference between the two cultures is that Americans demand freedom from rules, and India is a country with lots of rules—that everybody breaks. Indians praise obedience to tradition, but when push comes to shove, it is always the inner voice of intuition that wins out—an intuition that, at its best, inspires each individual to preserve the essence of the tradition as he or she changes it.
Research Interests: Music, Music Education, Musicology, Ethnomusicology, Indian Music, and 15 moreIndian studies, Historical Ethnomusicology, South Asia, World music, World Music Pedagogy, India, Islam and Music, Indian Classical Music, Hindustani music, North Indian Music, World music-Ethnomusicology, Hindustani classical music, South Asian Music, Music Cultures of the World, and World Musics
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Commentary on "Physicists, Detectives and Historians: Why Alan Sokal is Correct about the Logic of the Causal Relation" by H.E. Cline. Presented at the American Philosophy Association Meeting (Pacific division) in San Francisco March... more
Commentary on "Physicists, Detectives and Historians: Why Alan Sokal is Correct about the Logic of the Causal Relation" by H.E. Cline. Presented at the American Philosophy Association Meeting (Pacific division) in San Francisco March 2001
Research Interests: Poststructuralism, Identity politics, Postmodernism, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and 19 moreStructuralism/Post-Structuralism, Derridean Deconstruction, Thomas S. Kuhn, Derrida, Foucault and education, Thomas Kuhn, Jacques Derrida & Deconstruction, Poststructuralist Theory, Jean-François Lyotard, Foucault power/knowledge - discourse, Kuhn, Alan Sokal, Post-structuralism (especially the work of Jacques Derrida), Jaques Derrida, Michel Foucault and the theory of Power, Sokal Hoard, Posmodernidad, Lyotard, Sokal Hoax, and Sokal Affair
Some techniques I developed for changing the Mental strategies students use for solving math problems. Because I have very little "natural ability" for math, I had to transform myself before I could teach my students.
Research Interests: Mathematics, Teaching and Learning, Educational Technology, Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, Visualization, and 26 moreTeacher Education, Science Education, Philosophy Of Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Educational Psychology, Educational Research, Learning and Teaching, Visual Semiotics, Learning Styles, Teacher Research, Second Language Teacher Education, Visual Communication, Multimedia Learning, Teaching Methodology, Teacher Training, Teachers' professional development, Learning And Teaching In Higher Education, Mathematics Teacher Education, Teaching, Teacher, Maths, Reflective Teaching, Brain Based Learning, Educational studies, Neurolinguistic programming, and Using Digital Technology for Teaching Mathematics
Research Interests: Critical Race Studies, Race Studies, Race and Racism, Critical Race Theory, Race and Ethnicity, and 13 moreRace and Equity, Race Relations of Communities of Color, Philosophy Of Race, Critical Race Theory and Whiteness theory, Race and ethnicity (Anthropology), Gender and Race, History of Race and Ethnicity, Critical Mixed Race Studies, Race, Race relations, Mixed Race Identity, Race/Ethnicity, and Sociology of Ethnicity and Race
You can find Part 2 on the papers links page of this site.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Social Work, and 40 moreLiterature, Epistemology (Anthropology), Social Cognition, Storytelling, Use of story-telling in games, Interactive Digital Storytelling, Science Fiction, Fantasy Literature, Cognitive Linguistics, Transmedial Storytelling, Thought-Experiments, Ancient myth and religion, Science Fiction and Fantasy, Digital Storytelling, Short story (Literature), Thought Experiments, Social and cognitive functions of myth, Interactive Storytelling, Gilbert Ryle, Transmedia Storytelling, Epistemology of the Social Sciences, Literatura, Short story, Story, Philosophy of Thought Experiments, Story Telling, Storytelling and Self-Confrontation: Parables as Communication Strategies, Fantasy, Narrative, Mulitmedia editing, Journalism, Photojournalism, Storytelling, Audio and Video editing and digitizing, Television Journalism, Visual Communication, The Short Story, Digital Story Telling, Thought experiments in metaphysics, Parables, Story Writing, Storytelling and Narrative, Spatial Story Telling, Teaching a Short Story, Inspirational Stories, Transformation Through Story, and Short Story Analysis
I gave this talk with powerpoint at Sonoma State on 10/30/13. It is based on my paper Stakeholding and Safety Nets, but also includes criticisms of Ayn Rand and Anarchist Libertarianism.
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A talk I gave at the Center for NeuroBioEthics in 2010, with an introduction by our host James Giordano. It became the basis for my chapter in Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism. Edited by Shook and Solymosi, published by... more
A talk I gave at the Center for NeuroBioEthics in 2010, with an introduction by our host James Giordano. It became the basis for my chapter in Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism. Edited by Shook and Solymosi, published by Palgrave Macmillan.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, Pragmatism, and 10 morePragmatics, Embodied Cognition, Computational Neuroscience, Neuroethics, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Cognitive Neuroscience, Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics, American Pragmatism, Paul Churchland, and Patricia Churchland
by Evripidis Altintzoglou MA, BA (HONS) A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy September 2010 There is a chapter entilted "Searle and Rockwell"
Rockwell argues in this broad-ranging text that mind ought not to be identified with the brain. More generally, Rockwell argues for the rejection of "Cartesian materialism," his term for any attempt to identify mind with any particular... more
Rockwell argues in this broad-ranging text that mind ought not to be identified with the brain. More generally, Rockwell argues for the rejection of "Cartesian materialism," his term for any attempt to identify mind with any particular part of the "brain-body-world nexus." It is the partitioning of that nexus that is problematic.
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Teed Rockwell’s Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MIT 2005) is a welcome addition to the mind-body literature. Along with the philosophical contributions discussed below, Rockwell... more
Teed Rockwell’s
Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MIT 2005) is a welcome addition to the mind-body literature. Along with the philosophical contributions discussed below, Rockwell provides a valuable survey of recent developments in the relevant sciences, including a beautifully simple explanation of competing AI (artificial intelligence)strategies and techniques. If nothing else, the first three chapters summarizing recent developments in the sciences are worth reviewing for anybody working in the field, and the explanation of neural nets in the final chapter would be useful for any class addressing mentality. But the primary burden of the work is philosophical, and it is here that Rockwell makes his most interesting contributions. First, Rockwell makes a plausible case for the claim that assumptions of Cartesian materialism have contaminated much of the scientific and philosophical work in the area over the last fifty years (or longer). Second, in making this case, he also lays the groundwork for renewed attention to the “zombie problem” so derisively dismissed by Daniel Dennett (2005 and elsewhere) and others, for ignoring some of those irritating “brain in a vat” counter-examples, for abandoning or inverting the traditional understanding of the relationship between sentience and cognition, and for revitalizing the neglected pragmatist account of mind and the world.
Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (MIT 2005) is a welcome addition to the mind-body literature. Along with the philosophical contributions discussed below, Rockwell provides a valuable survey of recent developments in the relevant sciences, including a beautifully simple explanation of competing AI (artificial intelligence)strategies and techniques. If nothing else, the first three chapters summarizing recent developments in the sciences are worth reviewing for anybody working in the field, and the explanation of neural nets in the final chapter would be useful for any class addressing mentality. But the primary burden of the work is philosophical, and it is here that Rockwell makes his most interesting contributions. First, Rockwell makes a plausible case for the claim that assumptions of Cartesian materialism have contaminated much of the scientific and philosophical work in the area over the last fifty years (or longer). Second, in making this case, he also lays the groundwork for renewed attention to the “zombie problem” so derisively dismissed by Daniel Dennett (2005 and elsewhere) and others, for ignoring some of those irritating “brain in a vat” counter-examples, for abandoning or inverting the traditional understanding of the relationship between sentience and cognition, and for revitalizing the neglected pragmatist account of mind and the world.
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Articulates a version of Paul Churchland's vector space account of concepts and representation combined with an embodied cognition view advanced by Teed Rockwell. Primary goal is showing some compatibility between those views.
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As Rockwell points out in “Representation and Radical Empiricism,” this issue, theoretical progress (or, at least, clarification) in philosophy is often the happy result of the kind of friendly adversarial relationships that characterize... more
As Rockwell points out in “Representation and Radical Empiricism,” this issue, theoretical progress (or, at least, clarification) in philosophy is often the happy result of the kind of friendly adversarial relationships that characterize academic philosophical debates. Rockwell's paper is a case in point; he develops a theory of direct perception that bears some similarities with those defended in Chemero's
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
(RECS) and even comes to some similar conclusions, but it is precisely where he misunderstands Chemero that we find an opportunity to clarify what it is that RECS is all about. Rockwell presents his view as a slightly tempered endorsement of RECS that agrees that “minds and worlds are blended in a constantly shifting dynamic relationship, and that perception does not function by creating representations inside the brain,” but he expresses misgivings about some of Chemero's more radical claims and offers some correctives (Rockwell, p. 220). The problem is that both his misgivings and his suggested correctives betray a misunderstanding of some of the key features that make RECS a departure from traditional cognitive science – most importantly, the claim that nonmechanistic, dynamical explanations of perception, action, and cognition are genuine explanations. Among the many things we share with Rockwell is a fondness for Gilbert Ryle. When Rockwell named his book
Neither Brain Nor Ghost
, he was referring to Ryle’s famous “ghost in the machine”. Of course, we agree with Rockwell that cognitive science should not in the business of studying ghosts. What Rockwell fails to realize, though, is that according to RECS, cognitive science should not therefore be condemned to studying machines. Before explaining what this means, we will look at a few of the more important issues where it seems that Rockwell and Chemero disagree,
Radical Embodied Cognitive Science
(RECS) and even comes to some similar conclusions, but it is precisely where he misunderstands Chemero that we find an opportunity to clarify what it is that RECS is all about. Rockwell presents his view as a slightly tempered endorsement of RECS that agrees that “minds and worlds are blended in a constantly shifting dynamic relationship, and that perception does not function by creating representations inside the brain,” but he expresses misgivings about some of Chemero's more radical claims and offers some correctives (Rockwell, p. 220). The problem is that both his misgivings and his suggested correctives betray a misunderstanding of some of the key features that make RECS a departure from traditional cognitive science – most importantly, the claim that nonmechanistic, dynamical explanations of perception, action, and cognition are genuine explanations. Among the many things we share with Rockwell is a fondness for Gilbert Ryle. When Rockwell named his book
Neither Brain Nor Ghost
, he was referring to Ryle’s famous “ghost in the machine”. Of course, we agree with Rockwell that cognitive science should not in the business of studying ghosts. What Rockwell fails to realize, though, is that according to RECS, cognitive science should not therefore be condemned to studying machines. Before explaining what this means, we will look at a few of the more important issues where it seems that Rockwell and Chemero disagree,
Research Interests:
A Translation from the French of an article comparing me and Alva Noe. The Translator regularly chose literal over idiomatic translation, which makes it more accurate than elegant.
Research Interests: Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Situated Cognition, and 12 moreEmbodied Mind and Cognition, Metaphysics of Mind, Extended Mind, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Embodied Embedded Cognition, Internalism/Externalism, Alva Noe, Modularity of Mind, Extended Cognition, Enactive cognition, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, and Embodied, Situaded, Extended and Enactive Cognition and Affection (VTR and O&R Versions)
The original French Version of the article comparing TR to Alva Noe
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Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These... more
Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST). This book shows detailed scholarly connections between contemporary Cognitive Scicence and the classical pragmatists, especially John Dewey.
Representation et empirisme radical. La “ Radical Embodied Cognitive Science”, dont Anthony Chemero est l’un des defenseurs les plus importants, soutient que la cognition biologique ne necessite pas de representations. Je propose une... more
Representation et empirisme radical. La “ Radical Embodied Cognitive Science”, dont Anthony Chemero est l’un des defenseurs les plus importants, soutient que la cognition biologique ne necessite pas de representations. Je propose une position plus moderee – la cognition biologique repose souvent sur des representations analogiques continues, comme celles decrites par l’empirisme radical de James, plutot que sur les representations digitales discretes decrites par la theorie du langage de la pensee. Je concede toutefois que les representations analogiques constituent un cas-limite de representation. Les cas les plus prototypiques de representation sont les hypotheses qui sont developpees pendant le processus que Dewey appelait enquete. L’enquete est seulement necessaire quand notre relation harmonieuse avec l’environnement est derangee, ce qui requiert alors que nous representions cet environnement comme «autre » afin de nous imaginer comment nous pourrions restaurer cette harmonie. On peut legitimement decrire la perception comme «directe » etant donne que nous n’avons pas besoin de produire des representations quand l’organisme est en harmonie avec l’environnement.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Empiricism, Neuroimaging, and 15 moreCognitive Semantics, Mental Representation, Distributed Cognition, Embodied Cognition, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Neurophilosophy, Cognitive Linguistics, John Dewey, Music Cognition, Computational Philosophy of Language, Cognitive Neuroscience, Knowledge Representation, American Pragmatism, Jerry Fodor, and Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
Rockwell W. Teed. Response to Commentaries on “Representation and Radical Empiricism”. In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°61, 2014/1. Philosophie du Web et Ingénierie des Connaissances. pp. 327-331
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, Philosophy, and 15 moreEmpiricism, Neuroimaging, Mental Representation, Embodied Cognition, Computational Neuroscience, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Representations, Mental Representation and Content, Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Cognitive Neuroscience, Knowledge Representation, Representation Theory, Representation, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, and Memory Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Science began with the assumption sometimes called Cartesian Materialism-- that the brain is an autonomous machine that can be studied as a closed system. The challenges of solving the puzzles presupposed by that assumption led... more
Cognitive Science began with the assumption sometimes called Cartesian Materialism-- that the brain is an autonomous machine that can be studied as a closed system. The challenges of solving the puzzles presupposed by that assumption led to a recognition that mind is both embodied and embedded i. e. it cannot be separated from either the rest of the organism or from the organism’s symbiotic relationship with its environment. The unavoidable (but often ignored) implication of this conclusion is that if our environment includes other minds, our minds must also be embodied by other minds. This means that we are irreducibly social, for the same reasons that we are irreducibly embodied and embedded in an environment. This paper explores and questions the assumptions of Game Theory--the branch of computer science that assumes that society can only be understood as the interaction of isolated rational autonomous agents. If the Game Theory of the future were to follow the lead of cutting edge cognitive science, it would replace computational models with dynamical ones. Just as Extended Cognition theories recognize that the line between mind and world is a flexible one, Dynamic social theories would recognize that the line between mind and mind is equally flexible—that we must be understood not as autonomous individuals with selfish interests, but rather as fluctuating tribes or families dynamically bonded, and motivated not only by selfishness, but by trust, loyalty and love.
Research Interests: Social Theory, Psychology, Social Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Economics, and 11 moreGame Theory, Dynamical Systems, Social Sciences, Decision And Game Theory, Critical Social Psychology, Artificial Inteligence, Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Social Psycology, Inteligencia artificial, Emotions Social Psychology, and De Gruyter
We now know, thanks to Newton and his colleagues, that these kinds of descriptions, which presuppose something like free will and purpose, are not correct for stones. Skinner claimed that if we were consistent we would no longer apply... more
We now know, thanks to Newton and his colleagues, that these kinds of descriptions, which presuppose something like free will and purpose, are not correct for stones. Skinner claimed that if we were consistent we would no longer apply these assumptions to living ...
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Paul Churchland has recently attempted to distance himself from pragmatism to some degree, even though he still refers to himself as a ‘closet pragmatist’: That fringe account of classical truth occasionally advanced by the... more
Paul Churchland has recently attempted to distance himself from pragmatism to some degree, even though he still refers to himself as a ‘closet pragmatist’: That fringe account of classical truth occasionally advanced by the pragmatists…attempt(s) to define any representation as an instance of genuine knowledge just in case, when deployed, it produces successful behavior or navigation...crudely, a true proposition is one that works... This tempts me hardly at all... if we define or identify what counts as truth, or as knowledge, in terms of the behavioral successes it produces, then we will not be able to give a nontrivial explanation of those behavioral successes.1
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Neuropsychology, and 14 moreNeurology, Pragmatism, Embodied Cognition, Computational Neuroscience, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, Neural Networks, Cognitive Linguistics, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Neuroscience, Neural Network, Artificial Neural Networks for modeling purposes, American Pragmatism, and Artificial Neural Networks
TEED ROCKWELL 2419A Tenth Street, Berkeley, CA 94710, USA; E-mail: mcmf@california.com Abstract. I propose a semi-eliminative reduction of Fodor's concept of module to the concept of attractor basin which is used in Cognitive Dynamic... more
TEED ROCKWELL 2419A Tenth Street, Berkeley, CA 94710, USA; E-mail: mcmf@california.com Abstract. I propose a semi-eliminative reduction of Fodor's concept of module to the concept of attractor basin which is used in Cognitive Dynamic Systems Theory ...
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Computer Science, Dynamical Systems, Connectionism, Computational Neuroscience, and 15 moreEmbedded Systems, Nonlinear dynamics, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Distributed Processing, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Dynamic Systems Theory, Bifurcation, Modularity, Animal Locomotion, Cognitive Function, Dynamic System, Bifurcations, Orbit, and GOFAI
For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Today, Dan Dennett... more
For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Today, Dan Dennett and many others argue that all genuine scientific knowledge is in the form of mathematical algorithms. However, recently discovered neurocomputational algorithms can be used to justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which is non-algorithmic. The fact that these algorithms use prototype deployment, rather than mathematics or logic, gives us good reason to believe that there is a kind of knowledge that we derive from stories that is different from our knowledge of algorithms. Even though we would need algorithms to build a system that can make sense out of stories, we do not need to use algorithms when we ourselves embody a system that learns from stories. The success of the Galilean perspective in the physical sciences has often resulted i...
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Abstract: Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist¬ Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness (MDM). This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that... more
Abstract: Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist¬ Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness (MDM). This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question how do you get experience out ...
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Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness... more
Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.
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This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped themselves into complex patterns that eventually became living conscious beings. There is no decisive reason to question Peirce’s suggestion... more
This chapter questions the reductionist assumption that bits of lifeless matter must have grouped themselves into complex patterns that eventually became living conscious beings. There is no decisive reason to question Peirce’s suggestion that mind came first and that mechanical causality emerges when regions of a fundamentally conscious universe settle into deterministic habits. If we define consciousness in a way that ignores clearly accidental properties such as looking and behaving like us, some form of panpsychism is not only possible but plausible. Ignoring this possibility could cause us to subconsciously exclude legitimate avenues of research.
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Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as his epistemology became more... more
Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as his epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which ...
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In this article, I will be discussing these different Tilde Fallacy arguments in increasing order of general acceptability. The first argument is, as far as I know, accepted by no one today who has seriously studied the subject. The next... more
In this article, I will be discussing these different Tilde Fallacy arguments in increasing order of general acceptability. The first argument is, as far as I know, accepted by no one today who has seriously studied the subject. The next is accepted only by a small but vocal cult following. The third is accepted by a very large group probably including the majority of the academically employed. The last of these Tilde Fallacy arguments is acceptable to probably almost everyone except me (and perhaps you, gentle reader, if you find my arguments convincing). The topic of this argument is survival after biological death. The so-called "materialist" position, which I will call mortalism, relies heavily on the Tilde Fallacy. I will argue that once the Tilde Fallacy has been removed from the debate, the most ontologically parsimonious position is belief in reincarnation. I will also argue, at much greater length, that the mortalist position is self-contradictory, but that the co...
Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Religion, Atheism, Philosophical Theology, and 15 moreCritical Thinking, Psychology of Religion, Metaphysics of Mind, Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Panpsychism, Proof of God, Daniel Dennett, Argumentation Theory and Critical Thinking, Philosophy of God, Fallacies, Douglas Hofstadter, Fundamentalist Atheism, New Atheism, Cases of the Reincarnation Type, and Philosophy of Religion
Aristotle classified causes into 4 types. 1) Efficient Cause, in which a present event causes a future event. This is sometimes called a mechanical cause. 2) Final Cause, in which a future event (possible or actual) causes a present... more
Aristotle classified causes into 4 types. 1) Efficient Cause, in which a present event causes a future event. This is sometimes called a mechanical cause. 2) Final Cause, in which a future event (possible or actual) causes a present event. This is sometimes called a goal or a purpose. 3) Material Cause, such as the bronze of a statue 4) Formal Cause, such as the form of a statue. Today, thanks to Newton, and to some degree Descartes, efficient causality is the only one of these 4 that is usually considered respectable by modern science. We do speak of final causes in ordinary language to explain the behavior of persons. We say, for example, that Mary went to the Kitchen because she wanted a glass of wine. Philosopher Dan Dennett calls this way of thinking “the intentional stance”, (Dennett 1989) and says that regardless of its truth or falsity, it is impossible for us to understand our fellow persons without it. However, many scientists and lovers of science argue that we have to sp...
Although Dewey's influence has remained strong amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was unquestionably the most influential figure in American philosophy... more
Although Dewey's influence has remained strong amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was unquestionably the most influential figure in American philosophy until his death in 1952. Almost immediately after his death, however, Dewey's writings almost completely disappeared from the American philosophy syllabus. They were replaced by the analytic philosophers of the logical positivist tradition, who thought that philosophical problems could be solved by unraveling puzzles that came from a lack of understanding of proper language use. After several decades, however, the inadequacies of this view became unavoidably obvious, and the next generation of analytically trained philosophers began to find themselves saying things that sounded remarkably like Dewey. Many analytic philosophers began to use the word "pragmatist" to describe some aspect of their positions: Quine, Churchland, Davidson, Feyer...
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... London UK, ISBN 0-262-03240-6. Author(s): W. Teed Rockwell The Union Institute, 2419A Tenth St, Berkeley, CA 94710, USA 510/548-8779, USA. Abstract: No abstract received. Imperial College Press | Global Publishing | Asia ...
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Abstract The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind‐brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive... more
Abstract The unity of mind and body need not imply accepting the unity of mind and brain, because the mind‐brain identity is something that science has presupposed, not discovered. I cite evidence from modern neuroscience that cognitive activities are distributed ...